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Abstract
The winner of a battle for a throne can either execute or spare the loser; if the loser is
spared, he contends the throne in the next period. Executing the losing contender gives the
winner an additional quiet period, but then his life is at risk if he loses to some future contender
who might be, in equilibrium, too frightened to spare him. The trade-oﬀ is analyzed within a
dynamic complete information game, with, potentially, an inﬁnite number of long-term players.
In an equilibrium, decisions to execute predecessors are history-dependent. With a dynastic rule
in place, incentives to kill the predecessor are much higher than in non-hereditary dictatorships.
The historical part of our analytic narrative contains a detailed analysis of two types of non-
democratic succession: hereditary rule of the Osmanli dynasty in the Ottoman Empire in 1281—
1922, and non-hereditary military dictatorships in Venezuela in 1830—1964. .
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1“[Domitian] used to say that the lot of princes was most unhappy,
since when they discovered a conspiracy, no one believed them
unless they had been killed.”
Suetonius “Life of Domitian”
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
On December 23, 1989, Nicolae Ceau¸ sescu, a Romanian communist leader for 22 years, ﬂed his
residence in the presidential palace in Bucharest and was captured by army troops that revolted
after mass protests against his rule erupted the day before. On December 25, after a two-hour
military trial, he and his wife, a former ﬁrst deputy prime minister and the President of Romanian
Academy of Science, faced a ﬁring squad.1 What did those who captured and executed Ceau¸ sescu
have in mind? Why would not they wait for a regular process of justice, which might have very
likely ended the same way? This kind of perfectly real problems involved in leadership dynamics
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, Gallego and Pitchik, 2004, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2003) outside
the democratic world (Olson, 1993, Tullock, 1987, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005) enables us to
attempt to assess fundamental theoretical issues: what is reputation and what is knowledge in
historical perspective, and what are their workings in generation of history-dependence (North,
1981, 1990, Greif, 2004).2
What is the downside of executing the enemy when it is possible to do so and then enjoy
a period of quietness? The downside is that in this case, the current decision-maker might be
executed himself once removed from power. Sparing the life of a person who lost a ﬁght against
the incumbent makes his rule more troubling in the short-run (he will for certain have a powerful
1Though not a necessary consequence of a coup d’etat, a violent death of the fallen leader in a short period after
the coup is deﬁnitely not an isolated phenomenon. Examples of countries that have witnessed at least two killings of
the fallen leaders during the last 50 years include Afghanistan (Mohammad Daoud, 1978, Mohammad Taraki, 1979,
Haﬁzullah Amin, 1979), Bangladesh (Mujibur Rahman, 1975, Khalid Musharaf, 1975, Ziaur Rahman, 1981), Iraq
(Faisal II, 1958, Nuri as-Said, 1958, Abdul Karim Kassem, 1963), Nigeria (Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, 1966, Johnson
Aguiyi-Ironsi, 1966, Murtala Ramat Muhammad, 1974), Comoros (Ali Soilih, 1978, Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane,
1989), and Liberia (William Tolbert, 1980, Samuel Doe, 1990). For numerours historical examples see Section 4.
2Recent theoretical models of dictatorships include Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), Wintrobe (1998), Grossman
and Noh (1990), Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004), Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000), Overland, Simmons,
and Spagat (2000), and Restrepo and Spagat (2001). Empirical investigation of military coup dynamics include
Londregan and Poole (1990) and earlier works by Luttwak (1979), Ferguson (1978), and O’Kane (1978). Domínguez
(2002) contains an excellent overview of descriptive political science literature on modern dictatorships (see also Linz
and Chehabi, eds., 1998). Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) provide, alongside with numerous historical illustrations,
a most up-to-date analytical account of relationship between democracy and dictatorship.
2enemy alive), but then he will enjoy a higher probability of being spared himself once he loses a
ﬁght in the future. Formally, any decision by a rational agent incorporates future enemies’ opinion
of him as a result of his actions. If dictator A executed his predecessor B, then dictator C,w h o
eventually takes over A,i sl i k e l yt ok i l lA, being concerned about bloody reputation of A.T h i s
reputation would indeed matter for C, the decision-maker at the moment, since if A is spared then,
upon taking power back from C, A would likely execute C. ( O r ,m o r ep r e c i s e l y ,t h i si sw h a tC
would most naturally expect from A basing on A’s reputation.) One immediate result is that once
somebody takes over a bloody dictator, he might be ‘bound’ to become a bloody dictator himself.
This basic logic provides an immediate history-dependence: the current winner values his op-
tions diﬀerently depending on the type of his fallen enemy. It is an illustrative example of un-
derstanding institutions as equilibria, which elicit and pattern behavior of rational agents (Bates
et al, 1998, see also North, 1981, and Schotter, 1981). Concepts of path-dependence of economic
processes and multiple equilibria are inter-related since the pioneering work of Douglass North
(North, 1981, 1990).3 Recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu (2003) (see also
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, Lagunoﬀ, 2004a, and Acemoglu and Robinson, 2005) have devel-
oped a workable framework for dynamic analysis of political development.4 However, the reliance
on Markov-type dynamic models limit the ability of these theories to focus on mechanisms of path-
dependence.5 Indeed, any formal theory of this kind models path-depedence as multiple stable
equilibria. Our focus on reputational concerns allows us to go beyond the existing models by
explicitly demonstrating the workings of such a mechanism.
Our institutional focus on a single decision — to kill or to spare — is obviously very limited, espe-
cially when contrasted to big institutional economics issues such as political economy of property
rights or organization of trade (e.g., Greif, 2004). However, it is not without some clear advan-
tages. First, historians working with large (or potentially large), are often overwhelmed with the
identiﬁcation problem.6 For example, any analysis of interaction between the leadership turnover
and economic progress involves numerous idiosyncratic decisions on the researcher part even at
the stage of data collection. With respect to killings, historical sources are less ambiguous: in
3As a theoretical concept, multiple equilibria appeared earlier. In the ﬁeld of development, ﬁrst models of multiple
equilibria include Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989, 1993).
4In Egorov and Sonin (2004), the dictator’s strategy motivated by the desire to survive is analyzed within such a
framework.
5An approach diﬀe r e n tf r o mt h a to ft h i sp a p e rw h i c ha l s oa l l o w st og ob e y o n dM a r k o v - t y p ed y n a m i cm o d e l si n
institutional economics is suggested in Section 5.7 of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) and Acemoglu (2005). (Cf.
critique of such models in Bates et al., 2000.)
6See a note on General Blanco’s life in the Historical Narrative section, which, depending on diﬀerent plausible
interpretations, gives rise to markedly diﬀerent succession lines in Venezuela.
3most cases, there is no doubt whether an individual was or was not killed. (Motives of players are
of course much more ambiguous, and are subject to various interpretations.) Second, a narrowly
deﬁned issue allows to broaden the base of sources for historic narratives to provide comparisons
across regimes, space, and time (both historical and physical).
Economists are often concerned with problems that could be conceptualized best in classic
economic terms. E.g., games of reputation are analyzed as games of a long-term monopoly against
players who play only once but observe the entire previous history (Kreps and Wilson, 1982,
Milgrom and Roberts, 1982, Fudenberg and Kreps, 1982, Fudenberg and Levine, 1989, Sorin,
1999, and Ely, Fudenberg, and Levine, 2004; see also a discussion relating reputation literature to
historical studies in Appendix C in Greif, 2004). The game setup we consider has a political science
origin and has no straightforward IO parallel; still, the machinery developed within economic theory
is most suitable for our analysis. And while economic theorists’ assumptions are often stylized to
the point where they hardly approximate real decision-making problems, in reality people do face
the binary problem we investigate. As General Gelu Voican Voiculescu, appointed by the Romanian
revolutionary government to supervise the trial and burial of the Ceau¸ sescus, testiﬁed in 1995: “The
decision to try the couple was dictated by desire to survive — either them, or us.”
What deﬁnitely makes our theory a part of the ‘reputation’ literature in economics is that the
cost of executing a certain action is associated with the equilibrium response of a future player.
There is a long tradition in economic science to study reputation in games with incomplete infor-
mation, starting from seminal contributions of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts
(1982).7 We depart from this tradition and argue that many behavioral aspects of reputation could
be successfully studied in a complete information environment.8 Another departure from the eco-
nomic tradition in our model is that we have an inﬁnite number of (potentially) long-term players,
though at each moment only two of them interact.9
What social traits should be captured by a general theory of reputation? First, reputation
is something that changes over time. Second, a proper conceptualization of reputation requires
some sort of monotonicity: the more incidents of a certain action are committed by the reputation-
7Fudenberg and Kreps (1987) compare a standard reputation-building model (in which prior reputations are ﬁxed)
to a model in which the opponents do not observe how the long-term player played against other opponents.
8Bates et al. (2000), in an eﬀort to justify their Analytical Narrative approach (Bates et al., 1998, 2000) argue
that any use of model of incomplete information in a historical or political study should be avoided unless this “would
imply ignoring a central feature of the puzzle under investigation.”
9In economic theory, strategic dynamic interaction is most often modeled as a repeated game with a ﬁxed number of
participating agents. In our setup, in every decision node the deciding agent could always leave forever the interaction
with this particular opponent. Lagunoﬀ and Matsui (1995, 2004) introduce a concept of an ‘asynchronously repeated
game’. Our model is an example of such game.
4builder, the stronger is his reputation.10 However, reputation makes little sense unless we allow
at least one of the two actions (either the one that enhances reputation, or the one that ruins it)
to be veriﬁable someway. In the situation we focus on, it is easy to pretend to be bloody, e.g.
by revealing a dead body, and hard to pretend to be enlightened unless one is truly enlightened.
Once we have introduced this asymmetry, it becomes reasonable to focus exclusively on equilibria
in which contenders do not ‘believe’ in actions that can be faked. In our model, this rules out
equilibria where the dictator can reduce the probability of being executed by committing more
killings. This brings up the intuitively appealing monotonicity with respect to decisions players
make.
Though there is indeed a certain similarity between classic ‘reputation’ literature and this model,
one might argue that here reputation concern is more important for the players. In contrast with
the model of a long-term player facing a sequence of short-term ones, in our model every agent
cares about his reputation. Moreover, he needs to take into account the eﬀect of his actions as an
input into future players’ decision processes. Indeed, the decision to kill or to spare the current
loser requires understanding of not only the loser’s strategy (if he is spared), but also of future
contenders’ strategies. In the long-term monopoly models, the short-term players need to think
about future short-term players’ strategies, since this might aﬀect the current monopoly’s incentives
to maintain reputation, but they do not, obviously, care about their own reputation.
Of course, in the real world, the same reputation might be good in countering some types of
threats and detrimental in other situations. For example, a reputation of ‘toughness’ or ‘cruelty’
has at least two eﬀects for a ruler: First, potential contenders might be less willing to become actual
ones. Second, if potential contenders might be either strong or weak, the reputation for toughness
makes the selection of actual contenders more strong. The balancing eﬀect of a tough reputation
on the incumbent’s tenure is, therefore, unclear.11 In our model, this complication does not arise,
since the ‘supply side’ of contenders is exogenous.
For our analysis, we restrict the set of equilibria by letting each agent’s strategy to depend on
the number of killings committed by participants who are active at the moment rather than on
the entire history of the game. (See, e.g., Maskin and Tirole, 1998, who argue that it is plausible
to restrict the set of perfect equilibria in such a game by allowing agents’ strategies to depend
on ‘pay-oﬀ relevant’ histories only.) Our focus is on perfect equilibria: in any decision node, each
10Of course the consequences of reputation might be non-monotonic as, e.g., in Diamond (1991) or, most recently,
in Ely and Valimaki (2004).
11This eﬀect arise, albeit under very diﬀerent circumstances, as ‘bad reputation’ in Ely and Valimaki (2003) and
Ely, Levine, and Valimaki (2004).
5agent’s strategy is optimal given strategies of other agents.12 Furthermore, we require that all
equilibria are ‘fake-murder proof’: eﬀectively, this requirement imposes monotonicity with respect
to killings of losers. In any such equilibrium, each additional murder implies a higher probability
of being punished (so there is no forgiveness or indulgence), until the probability of punishment
reaches one. Once it does, fear of additional chance of being punished is no longer in eﬀect, and
the agent opts to execute every time.
It appears that these relatively mild restrictions on equilibria allow to get meaningful compar-
ative statics even though the number of equilibria is still large. We deﬁne ‘maximum patience’ of
equilibria as the maximum number of killings a dictator can commit while still facing a non-zero
probability of being spared if overthrown. This value is well deﬁned (it is always a ﬁnite number)
and has intuitive properties. The maximum patience is increasing in the probability that a new
contender appears in the next period despite execution of the previous one, and is decreasing in
the incumbent’s survival rate. It also increases in the cost of losing life and decreases in the utility
of being in power.
Historically, understanding of idea of reputation for executions manifested itself in various laws
and constitutional clauses. The idea of restraint in killing defeated political opponents might be
the most basic of all constitutional constraints. The problem is addressed in the Hittite Telipinu
Proclamation (van den Hout, 1997), which may be the world’s oldest existing document of the
West. After discussing the excessive number of revolts and civil wars, King Telipinu stipulates
that high nobles should not be killed in secret, but should only be killed after a trial before the
Council of the realm. Also, when someone is convicted of a treason, his innocent family members
should not be killed, and his property should not be conﬁscated. The reason for the ﬁr s tr u l ei s
apparently to avoid provoking preemptive revolts, and the second rule could prevent forcing rebel’s
family members to support his rebellion (which would spur a sequence of reputation-based killings).
Abolishment of conﬁscations might also be aimed at eliminating an incentive for palace bureaucrats
to falsely accuse a noble of a treason.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the formal game.
Section 3 contains analysis of the game. In Section 4, the empirical part of our analytic narrative
(Bates et al., 1998, 2000, Levi, 2003) centers around a detailed analysis of two types of non-
democratic succession: hereditary rule of the Osmanli dynasty in the Ottoman Empire in 1281—
1922, and non-hereditary military dictatorships in Venezuela in 1830—1964. Section 5 concludes.
12Bates et al. (1998) justify the use of perfect equilibria in such games as most appropriate for modeling institutions.
62F o r m a l S e t u p
2.1 Players, Payoﬀs, and Timing
We assume time to be discrete, t =1 ,2,...∞. Each player comes and ﬁghts with the incumbent;
the ﬁght is modeled as a lottery. If a player is the winner, he decides what to do with the loser,
kill or spare. The spared loser becomes the contender in the next period. If the loser is executed,
there might be no contender in the next period. However, in two periods, a new contender arrives
with certainty. We formalize this as follows: there is an inﬁnite sequence of identical players
i =1 ,2,...∞, each of which joins the active part of the game sequentially. In each period t,t h e r e
is one player (the identity of this player is Dt ∈ N) who is the incumbent dictator in this period. In
each period, there may be a player Ct ∈ N, the contender (we write Ct =0if there is no contender
in period t).
In period t, Dt =1and Ct =2 .F o re a c hp e r i o dt,l e tNt denote the identity of player with the
l e a s tn u m b e rw h oh a sn o tj o i n e dt h ea c t i v ep a r to ft h eg a m ey e t( f o re x a m p l e ,N1 =3 ). Let Wt
and Lt denote the winner and the loser of the ﬁght period t, respectively.
Denote the instantaneous utility player i receives in period t by Ut (i). W ea s s u m et h a ti f
i 6= Dt and i 6= Ct,t h e nUt (i)=0 . In other words, only actively participating players can get a
non-trivial utility in the current period. In each period t,a g e n ti (actually, only agent Wt)c h o o s e s
an action that maximizes his expected future life-time utility U (i)=E
∞ P
τ=1
βτUτ (i),w h e r eβ<1
is the discount factor, and expectation is taken conditional on the entire game history Ht (see the
deﬁnition below). In each period t, the sequence of actions and events is as follows.
1. If Ct 6=0 , then the contender attempts to become the dictator. If Ct =0 ,t h e nWt = Dt,
Lt = Ct =0 , Ct+1 = At,a n dAt+1 = At +1 , and in this case steps 2 — 4 are skipped.
2. The ﬁght breaks out, and the contender wins with probability 0 <p<1.I n o t h e r w o r d s ,
P(Lt = Dt)=P(Wt = Ct)=p,a n dP(Wt = Dt)=P(Lt = Ct)=1− p.
3. Wt decides on his action At, whether to execute (At = E)o rs p a r e( At = S)t h el o s e rLt.
4. If At = E,t h e nUt (Lt)=−D, and with probability µ<1 there is still a successor in the
next period (Ct+1 = At and At+1 = At +1), and with probability 1−µ there is no successor
(Ct+1 =0 ). If At = S,t h e nUt (Lt)=0 ,a n dCt+1 = Lt.
5. The winner gets Ut (Wt)=Y , and becomes the next dictator, i.e. Dt+1 = Wt.
72.2 Strategies
First, we introduce the history ht of period t,w h i c hi st h e6-tuple ht =( Dt,C t,W t,L t,N t,A t).
Also, we denote the projection of ht on its ﬁrst 5 components by ˆ ht,s oˆ ht =( Dt,C t,W t,L t,N t).







× ˆ ht.W e c a l l
history Ht feasible if it can be a result of some path of the game. The set of feasible histories is





t etc. denote the dictator, contender etc. of period t in history ξ13. A strategy of




Aξ,w h e r eAξ ∈ ∆({E,S}).











,w h e r eI (·) is the indicator function. We focus on perfect equilibria: in
any decision node, each agent’s strategy is optimal given strategies of other agents. We further
restrict the set of equilibria by letting agents’ strategies depend on the number of killings committed
by participants who are active at the moment. (Similarly, Maskin and Tirole, 1998, restrict the set
of perfect equilibria in a dynamic duopoly game by allowing agents’ strategies to depend on ‘pay-oﬀ





































equality Aξ = Aη holds.
Denote the expected future utility of winner W
ξ















if he executes. Likewise, denote the expected






(note that he does not determine his own fate). In the case
of stationary equilibria, we can simplify this notation. For n ∈ N ∪ {0},l e tn+ ≡ n +1 .F o r








,i fξ satisﬁes W
ξ
|ξ| = m and L
ξ
|ξ| = n.T h i s
is well-deﬁned in the sense that UE
mn does not depend on the history, and there exists at least one





















.L e t Wmn =( 1− p)Umn + pVmn, which is simply the expected
utility of an incumbent dictator before engaging in a ﬁght. Finally, let αmn be such that Aξ =
αmnE +( 1− αmn)S if ξ satisﬁes the properties stated above (evidently, αmn is the probability of
execution). Since numbers αmn deﬁne a stationary strategies proﬁle uniquely, we will further refer
to it by α.




|ξ| is equal to 0,w h i c hm e a n st h a ta t
no period can two players that killed before be actively participating. This may be proved by induction on |ξ|:i fi n
period |ξ|−1 there was an execution, then in period |ξ| there is an innocent newcomer, and if there was no execution,

























Figure 1: Switching of States of the Game
Assuming stationary strategies, everything depends on the number of executions performed by
the current dictator and the current contender; accordingly, we will say that the game is in the state
(m,n) at the time the decision on execution or sparing is made if the winner (the decision-maker)
killed m times before and the loser (his opponent) killed n times. In that case, the switching of
the game between diﬀerent states is summarized on Figure 1. The choice of a solid line (execute
or spare) is in the hands of the current dictator, while it is the nature that decides whether dashed
or dotted line will be followed. When making his decision, the winner of the ﬁght should take into
a c c o u n tt h a tn e x tt i m eh ew i l lw i nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1−p a n dl o s ew i t hp r o b a b i l i t yp, and this will
have an impact on the next state of the game as well as his role in it.
Deﬁnition 1 We say that a stationary equilibrium satisﬁes the single-crossing condition (Mil-



























































Deﬁnition 2 A stationary equilibrium is called monotonic,i ff o ra n ym ≥ 0, α0m ≤ α0m+.
Deﬁnition 3 A stationary equilibrium is said to have non-decreasing murder rate,i ff o ra n y
m ≥ 0, αm0 ≤ αm+0.
Deﬁnition 4 A stationary equilibrium is said to have non-increasing (with additional murder)
utility,i ff o ra n ym ≥ 0, Um0 ≥ Um+0.
9Suppose now that at any time a player makes a decision whether to spare or execute, he can
commit a incidental murder M, instead of playing E or S. This action yields the same payoﬀs( f o r
both players) in that period as action S: the loser is not executed, and the winner gets no period of
safe rule). However, action M counts against the number of murders he committed; to capture this,












A n ys t r a t e g yp r o ﬁle of the game (and any equilibrium proﬁle in particular) is also a strategy proﬁle
of the extended game (with action M), and utilities Umn, UE
mn, US
mn, Vmn and Wmn are the same,
provided that this proﬁle of strategies is played. Let UM
mn be the expected utility of a player who
opts to play M when the game is in state (m,n), if after that, the game evolves according to the
proﬁle considered; this value is well-deﬁn e d( a n di se q u a lt oUS
m+0). We use it to formulate the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5 A stationary equilibrium is said to be fake murder-proof, if for any m ≥ 0, US
m0 ≥
UM
m0,i . e .i fam u r d e ry i e l d sn od i r e c tu t i l i t y ,i ti su n p r o ﬁtable to commit it.
In our analysis, we focus on symmetric equilibria in single-crossing stationary strategies. We
justify this by proving that single-crossing, monotonic, non-decreasing murder rate, non-increasing
utility, and fake murder-proof conditions deﬁne the same set of symmetric stationary equilibria.
3A n a l y s i s
3.1 Necessary Equilibrium Conditions
Suppose that the winner of the ﬁght ﬁnds himself in state (m,n). He has to choose between
executing and sparing, which will aﬀect the state of the game according to Figure 1. The analogs
of the Bellman equation for our problem look as follows14:







Wmn =( 1 − p)Umn + pVnm;( 2 )
UE
mn = Y + β ((1 − µ)(Y + βWm+0)+µWm+0);( 3 )
US
mn = Y + βWmn;( 4 )
Vmn =( 1 − αmn)β ((1 − p)Vmn + pUnm) − αmnD.( 5 )
14For a strategy proﬁle to form a subgame perfect equilibrium, it is suﬃcient that at any decision node, a one-
period deviation does not increase player’s expected utility. By induction, no deviation that alters behavior in a ﬁnite
number of periods increases expected utility. If there is a deviation that changes behavior in an inﬁnite number of
periods and strictly increases utility, then there is a deviation that changes behavior in a suﬃciently large but ﬁnite
number of periods while still increasing utility.
10We start with deriving necessary conditions to characterize equilibria that consist of stationary
strategies. The purpose of the analysis is twofold. First, it is a prerequisite to full description
of equilibria. Second, this will allow us prove the equivalence of equilibria with single-crossing,
monotonic, non-increasing utility, and fake murder-proof strategies.
Lemma 1 Suppose X is one of variables Umn,US
mn,UE
mn,V mn,W mn.T h e n−D ≤ X< Y
1−β.
Proof. X is the expectation of a discounted sum of numbers, each of which is equal to either
−D,0,o rY ; the negative term −D may occur only once in this sum. The sum of any series that
satisﬁes this property lies between −D and Y
1−β. Finally, X may not equal Y
1−β, because there is a
non-trivial probability of losing a ﬁght in the future, and thus the series cannot consist of Y ’s only.
Now consider the function
S (α) ≡
Y (1 − (1 − α)β (1 − p)) − βαpD
(1 − β (1 − p)) − (1 − α)β (1 − β (1 − p) − (1 − β)p)
.( 6 )
As we will prove, this function is the lower bound for the incumbent’s life-time expected utility.
Lemma 2 S (α) is a strictly decreasing function.




βp(βpY + D(1 − β)(1− β +2 βp))
((1 − β (1 − p)) − (1 − α)β (1 − β (1 − p) − (1 − β)p))
2 < 0.( 7 )
We will need the following information on the values of the function S (α) later on:
S (0) ≡
Y (1 − β (1 − p))




1 − β (1 − p)
.
The next lemma states its relation to the expected utility of an agent who opts to spare.
Lemma 3 Umn ≥ S (αnm). Moreover, if US
mn ≥ UE
mn,t h e n
Umn = S (αnm). (8)
Proof. Equation (5) yields that
Vnm =
(1 − αnm)βpUmn − αnmD
1 − (1 − αnm)β (1 − p)
.
11Also, we use (2) to ﬁnd that
Wmn =
1 − p − β (1 − αnm)(1− 2p)
1 − (1 − αnm)β (1 − p)
Umn −
αnmpD
1 − (1 − αnm)β (1 − p)
.( 9 )
Therefore, (4) implies that
US
mn = Y + β
1 − p − β (1 − αnm)(1− 2p)
1 − (1 − αnm)β (1 − p)
Umn −
βαnmpD
1 − (1 − αnm)β (1 − p)
.
Taking into account inequalities Umn ≥ US
mn and
β
1 − p − β (1 − αnm)(1− 2p)










= S (αnm) (10)
(the last equality is proved by multiplication of both the numerator and the denominator by 1 −
(1 − αnm)β (1 − p)). This proves the ﬁrst part of the statement. To prove the second part, note
that if US
mn ≥ UE
mn,t h e nUmn = US
mn. In that case, the inequality (10) turns into equality, and
yields Umn = S (αnm).
The next two lemmas establish that the ‘talion law’ holds in any equilibrium: for any number
of previous killings n, a person who executed contenders n times before is executed by one who has
no killings in his record with probability one if and only if he would execute a newcomer.
Lemma 4 For any n ≥ 0, α0n =1implies UE
n0 >U S
n0,a n dαn0 =1implies UE
0n >U S
0n.
Proof. A s s u m et h ec o n t r a r y .C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eα0n =1 , but UE
n0 ≤ US
n0 (the remaining case
may be treated in a similar way). Therefore, Un0 = S (1). If, however, he chooses to kill once, then
he gets UE
n0 = Y +β ((1 − µ)(Y + βWn+0)+µWn+0)=( 1+β (1 − µ))Y +β (β (1 − µ)+µ)Wn+0.
Observe that
Wn+0 =( 1− p)Un+0 + pV0n+ ≥ (1 − p)S (1) − pD.
Here, we used inequalities Un+0 ≥ S (α0n+) ≥ S (1), which holds because S (α) is a decreasing
function, and V0n+ ≥− D by lemma (1). Therefore,
UE
n0 − Un0
≥ (1 + β (1 − µ))Y + β (β (1 − µ)+µ)((1 − p)S (1) − pD) − S (1)
=
βp(1 − µ)(Y + D(1 − β))
1 − β (1 − p)
> 0.
However, in an equilibrium, Un0 ≥ US
n0 must hold, a contradiction.





αn0 =1 ,a n dα0n =1are equivalent.
Proof. UE
n0 >U S
n0 implies αn0 =1 ,a n dUE
0n >U S
0n implies α0n =1 . The remaining implications
a r ep r o v e di nL e m m a4 .
3.2 Monotonicity
Theorem 1 For any symmetric stationary equilibrium, the following ﬁve conditions are equivalent:
(i) the equilibrium satisﬁes the single-crossing condition: if the winner strictly preferred to kill
the loser rather than to spare when the number of killings he committed before was m, he still strictly
prefers to kill when the number of killings he committed is m +1 ;
(ii) equilibrium strategies are (weakly) monotonic with respect to the number of murders commit-
ted by the loser: the larger is the number of killings committed by him, the higher is the probability
that he is executed;
(iii) equilibrium strategies are (weakly) monotonic with respect to the number of murders com-
mitted by the winner: the more killings he already committed, the more likely he is to execute;
(iv) the equilibrium satisﬁes non-increasing utility conditions;
(v) the equilibrium is fake murder-proof: if the winner is allowed to make fake killings, which do
not remove contenders, but count against his reputation, he ﬁnds this option no better than sparing.
Proof. (v) =⇒ (ii) Any stationary fake murder-proof equilibrium is a stationary monotonic
equilibrium.
Assume the contrary, i.e. α0m+ <α 0m.T h i si m p l i e sα0m+ < 1,a n dt h u sαm+0 < 1, therefore
US
m+0 ≥ UE
m+0.I nt h a tc a s e ,Um+0 = US
m+0 = S (α0m+). Obviously, that’s also equal to UM
m0,f o r
UM
m0 = Y + βWm+0. Fake murder-proofness implies US
m0 ≥ S (α0m+) >S(α0m) (the latter holds
because α0m+ <α 0m by assumption). Therefore, UE
m0 >U S
m0, for otherwise US
m0 = S (α0m).T h i s ,
in its turn, implies Um0 >S(α0m), which contradicts Lemma 3.
(iv) =⇒ (ii) Any stationary non-increasing utility equilibrium is a stationary monotonic equi-
librium.
Assume the contrary, i.e. α0m+ <α 0m.A sa b o v e ,w eo b t a i nUm+0 = US
m+0 = S (α0m+).N o n -
increasing utility condition implies Um0 ≥ Um+0 ≥ S (α0m+) >S(α0m). As demonstrated in the
proof of the previous claim, this leads to a contradiction.
(iii) =⇒ (ii) Any stationary non-decreasing murder rate equilibrium is a stationary monotonic
equilibrium.
13Assume the contrary, i.e. α0m+ <α 0m.I fα0m =1 , then, by Lemma 5, αm0 =1 . Non-decreasing
murder rate implies αm+0 =1 , and thus, again by Lemma 5, α0m+ =1 , which contradicts the
assumption α0m+ <α 0m.I fα0m < 1,t h e nUm+0 = US
m+0 = S (α0m+) and Um0 = US
m0 = S (α0m),
and hence Um0 <U m+0. From this, using (3) and (4),o n eg e t sUm0 = UE
m0 =( 1 − µ)Y +
((1 − µ)β + µ)US
m+0 > (1 − µ)Y + ((1 − µ)β + µ)Um0, which implies Um0 > Y
1−β. This violates
Lemma (1), and therefore leads to a contradiction.
(ii) =⇒ (i)Any stationary monotonic equilibrium satisﬁes the single-crossing condition.
Suppose that UE
m0 >U S
m0. Then, by lemma 5, α0m =1 . Monotonicity condition implies
α0m+ =1 , and we use lemma 5 once again to get UE
m+0 >U S
m+0.
We showed that any of the three reﬁnements (ii) — (iv) leads to equilibria satisfying single-
crossing condition. Now we establish some lemmas about the properties of such equilibria, which are
important per se and will allow us to demonstrate that these equilibria are fake murder-proof, non-
increasing utility and monotonic. This will complete the proof of equivalence of these reﬁnements.
Proofs of these lemmas are relegated to Appendix.
Lemma 6 If α0n =1 ,t h e nα0n+ =1 .I np a r t i c u l a r ,α0m =1for all m>n .
Lemma 7 There exists ε>0 such that if α0n+ < 1,t h e nS (α0n) >S(α0n+)+ε (which implies
α0n <α 0n+).
Lemma 8 There exists k ≥ 0 such that αn0 =1and α0n =1for n ≥ k,a n dαn0 < 1 and α0n < 1
for n<k .
The two previous lemmas imply that the ‘reputation’ sequence {α0n} is strictly increasing until
it reaches 1, and once it does, it stabilizes. Intuitively, it means that in any equilibrium under
consideration, each additional murder implies a higher probability of being punished (so there is no
forgiveness or indulgence), until the probability of punishment reaches its maximum. Once it does,
fear of additional chance of being punished is no longer in eﬀect, and the agent opts to execute
e v e r yt i m e( a n ds oαn0 =1once α0n =1 ).
Another corollary is that in the sequence {α0n}, only the ﬁrst term α00 may equal 0.O t h e r
terms are strictly positive. This means that in the equilibria under consideration, no murder can be
completely forgiven, and anyone who has executed at least once is subject to a non-zero probability
of punishment.
Lemma 9 Assume that 0 <α 0m <α 0m+ < 1.T h e nαm0 = αm+0.
Denote
A ≡
(1 + β (1 − µ))Y − β (β (1 − µ)+µ)pD
1 − β (β (1 − µ)+µ)(1− p)
.
14Lemma 10 If m is such that α0m =1 ,t h e nUm0 = UE
m0 = A.M o r e o v e r ,A>S(1).
Lemma 11 If m is such that α0m+ =1 ,t h e nUE
mn = A.
Now we are ready to ﬁnish the proof of Theorem 1.
(i) =⇒ (iii) Any stationary single-crossing equilibrium satisﬁes the non-decreasing murder rate
property.
For any m ≥ 0,e i t h e rα0m+ =1or α0m+ < 1.I nt h eﬁrst case, αm0 ≤ αm+0 because αm0 ≤ 1
and αm+0 =1by Lemma 5. In the latter case, if α00 > 0 or m>0,t h e n0 <α 0m <α 0m+ < 1
by Lemma 7, which by Lemma 9 implies αm0 = αm+0.F i n a l l y , i f α00 =0and m =0 ,t h e n
αm0 =0≤ αm+0, i.e. the inequality holds in this case, too.
(i) =⇒ (iv) Any stationary single-crossing equilibrium satisﬁes the non-increasing utility prop-
erty.
For any m ≥ 0,e i t h e rα0m+ =1or α0m+ < 1.I nt h eﬁrst case, UE
m0 = A,a n da l s oα0(m+2) =1 ,
which implies UE
m+0 = A as well. Since α0m+ =1 , Um+0 = UE
m+0 = A = UE
m0 ≤ Um0.I n t h i s
case, non-increasing utility property is satisﬁed. In the latter case, Um+0 = S (α0m+),w h i l eUm0 =
S (α0m),s i n c eα0m <α 0m+ < 1. Therefore, in this case, Um+0 = S (α0m+) <S(α0m)=Um0.
(i) =⇒ (v) Any stationary single-crossing equilibrium is fake murder-proof.
For any m ≥ 0,e i t h e rα0m+ =1or α0m+ < 1.I nt h eﬁrst case, α0m+ = α0m++ =1 , and therefore
UM
m0 = Y +β ((1 − p)Um+0 + pV0m+)=Y +β ((1 − p)A − pD) ≤ Y +β ((1 − p)Um0 + pV0m)=US
m0
(because V0m ≥− D). In the latter case, UM
m0 = Y + β ((1 − p)Um+0 + pV0m+)=S (α0m+) <
S (α0m)=Y + β ((1 − p)Um0 + pV0m)=US
m0. In both cases, fake-murder proof condition holds.
As for monotonicity condition in stationary single crossing equilibria, it trivially follows from
lemmas 6 and 7.
3.3 Best Responses
To analyze best responses, we introduce mapping T : R → R given by
T (x)=( 1− µ)Y +( β (1 − µ)+µ)x.
This mapping is contracting to the point Y
1−β.F o r x< Y
1−β we have T (x) >x .D e n o t e Tn =
T ◦ ...◦ T | {z }
n times















15Before proceeding, we prove a theorem which distinguishes between two main cases: where
there is only one equilibrium, where players choose to execute at every decision node, and where
there are multiple equilibria, which is the most interesting case.
Theorem 2 Proﬁle of strategies where αmn =1for all m and n always constitutes an equilibrium.
Moreover, if S (0) <A , it is the only equilibrium. If S (0) ≥ A, there are at least two diﬀerent
equilibria.
Proof. By Lemma 4, it is always rational to execute in the state (m,n), because αnm =1 .T h i s
proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition.
If S (0) <A , then there exists another equilibrium, where α00 =0 ,a n dαmn =1for m+n>0.
The rationale for execution is literally the same. However, if S (0) ≥ A, then the player who chooses
to spare gets S (0) by deﬁnition, while he who opts to execute gets UE
m0 = A ≤ S (0).T h e r e f o r e ,
at (0,0) it is best response to spare, and thus this constitutes an equilibrium.
Note that if S (0) <A , there is also a third equilibrium, given by α00 = S−1 (A),a n dαmn =1
for m + n>0. In this case, a person in state (0,0) is indiﬀerent between executing and sparing.
Now, in order to characterize equilibria, it is useful to summarize best responses on strategies
played by other people. Of course, we may restrict ourselves to strategies that satisﬁes the necessary
conditions obtained in the previous subsection. Furthermore, as usual in dynamic games, it is
suﬃcient here to consider one-shot deviations only, i.e. every player considers his future actions as
given by the proﬁle of strategies under consideration.
Lemma 12 Let α be a proﬁle of strategies satisfying lemmas of the previous subsection. If αnm <





{E},i f S (αnm) <X;
{S},i f S (αnm) >X;
∆({E,S}),i f S (αnm)=X,
(12)
where X = T (S (α0m+)) if α0m+ < 1,a n dX = A if α0m+ =1 .I fαnm =1 ,t h e nBRmn (α)={E}
(i.e. the above formula holds).
Proof. If αnm < 1,t h e nUS
mn = S (αnm).I fα0m+ =1 ,t h e nb yL e m m a1 1UE
mn = A.I fα0m+ < 1,
then from (4) we get S (α0m+)=US
m+0 = Y + βWm+0; eliminating Wm+0 from this and from (3),
we get UE
mn = T (S (α0m+)).T h e r e f o r e (12) simply means that a player chooses the action that
yields higher utility. If αnm =1 ,t h e nb yL e m m a4UE
mn >U S
nn, i.e. best response is to execute.
Note that it satisﬁes (12),f o rX is either equal to A or to T (S (α0m+)),a n db o t hA>S(1) and
T (S (α0m+)) >S(α0m+) ≥ S (1),s i n c eS (α0m+) < Y
1−β.
16The last statement lays out some necessary equilibrium conditions.
Deﬁnition 6 Suppose that proﬁle α constitutes an equilibrium. Denote π(α)=
max{n | α0n < 1}.( I f t h e r e i s n o s u c h n,i . e . α00 =1 , we write π(α)=−∞). We call this
number the patience of equilibrium.
In this interpretation, patience is the maximum number of murders one can commit to still have
a non-zero chance of being spared in the future.
Lemma 13 In any equilibrium given by α, π (α) satisﬁes
Tπ(α) (A) ≤ S (0). (13)
Proof. For any m ≤ π (α), α0m < 1, and thus αm0 < 1.T h e r e f o r e ,S ∈ BRm0 (α),a n db yL e m m a
12, S (α0m) ≥ T (S (α0m+)) for m<π (α),a n dS (α0m) ≥ A for m = π(α). Combining these
inequalities, we obtain S (0) ≥ Tπ(α) (A).
Evidently, this implies that the equilibrium patience function, π (α), is bounded from above.
The following theorem gives the exact boundary.
Theorem 3 Denote





1−β − S (0)
!
. (14)
Let M = b¯ πc, where brackets mean rounding down to the nearest integer. Then for any equilibrium
α we have π(α) ≤ M.
Proof. Substituting x = A and n = π (α) in the equation (11),w eﬁnd (using (13))t h a t
³
Y
1−β − S (0)
´






.S i n c e0 <β(1 − µ)+µ<1,w eh a v eπ(α) ≤ ¯ π.
Now π (α) ≤ M follows from the fact that π (α) is an integer.
3.4 Equilibria
Our next step is to characterize all stationary equilibria. In particular, we demonstrate that if
M ≥ 0, then there exists an equilibrium α such that π(α)=M, i.e. this boundary is always
achieved. Thus, we can call M maximum patience for a given set of parameters. Note that if
S (0) ≥ A, which is the case if and only if there are multiple equilibria (Theorem 2), then M ≥ 0.
We characterize equilibria with a given level of patience m ≤ M.W ec o n s i d e ri tu s e f u lt od i s c u s s
m<1 (a simple case) and m ≥ 1 (an interesting case) separately.
17Theorem 4 (i) Proﬁle α such that αmn =1for every m,n always constitutes an equilibrium such
that π(α)=−∞.
(ii) If M ≥ 0, then there exist one or two equilibria with patience π (α)=0 . In these equilibria,
αmn =1for all (m,n) except for (0,0); α00 is either 0 or S−1 (A).I fS−1 (A) > 0,t h e s ee q u i l i b r i a
are diﬀerent, otherwise they coincide.
Proof. (i) This was actually proved as part of Theorem 2; it is anyway easy to check that if one’s
opponents play such strategy, best response is to execute (Lemma 12).
(ii) T h ef a c tt h a ta l lαmn’s should equal to 1,w h i l eα00 should not, follows from deﬁnition of
patience. If α00 > 0,t h e nBR00 (α) includes both E and S,a n dt h e nb yL e m m a1 2 ,S (0) = A.
Consequently, α00 is either 0 or S−1 (A) (the latter is not equal to 1,f o rt h a tw o u l di m p l yS (1) = A,
which violates Lemma 10). It is easy to check, using Lemma 12, that for any of the two α00’s, we
obtain an equilibrium. If both numbers are equal (which is the case if and only if ¯ π = M =1 15),
equilibria coincide.
Now consider the case m ≥ 1. In this case, in particular, 0 <α 01 < 1,a n dα10 < 1.O n t h e
other hand, αn0 = α0n =1for n>m . We consider cases α10 6=0and α10 =0separately.
Theorem 5 Assume M ≥ 1 and 1 ≤ m ≤ M.
(i) If S−1 (Tm (A)) > 0, then there are two and only two equilibria that satisfy π (α)=m and
α10 6=0 . In both of them, for 1 ≤ n ≤ m, α0n = S−1 (Tm−n (A)),a n dαn0 = S−1 (Tm (A)).I no n e
equilibrium α00 = S−1 (Tm (A)), while in the other one α00 =0 . If, however, S−1 (Tm (A)) = 0
(which is the case if and only if m =¯ π = M16), there are no such equilibria.
(ii) There always exists at least one equilibrium such that π(α)=m and α10 =0 .I n a n y
equilibrium satisfying these conditions, for 0 ≤ n ≤ m, αn0 =0(in particular, α00 =0 ), and
α01 = S−1 ◦ T−1 ◦ S (0).A sf o rα0n for 1 <n≤ m if m ≥ 2, these can be any numbers satisfying
α0m ≤ S−1 (A) and α0n ≤ S−1◦T◦S (α0n+) if n<m .A n yα satisfying these conditions constitutes
an equilibrium. If m =¯ π = M or m =1 , then this series yields a unique equilibrium. Otherwise,
there are continuum equilibria in this series.
Proof. (i) All probabilities αn0, 1 ≤ n ≤ m, are equal (Lemma 9). If α10 6=0 , they are non-zero
(but not equal to one either, by Lemma 5 and the assumption that π(α)=m), and therefore for
1 ≤ n ≤ m, BRn0 (α) includes both E and S. Hence, it is easy to prove by induction, using Lemma
12, that for 1 ≤ n ≤ m, α0n = S−1 (Tm−n (A)).S i n c eπ(α) ≥ 1, α01 < 1, and hence, by the same
Lemma, αn0 = S−1 (Tm (A)) for 1 ≤ n ≤ m.I fα00 6=0 ,t h e nb yL e m m a9i te q u a l sS−1 (Tm (A)).
15This is discussed in the proof of Theorem 5 in a more general case.
16This is a degenerate case, since this requires, in particular, ¯ π (found from (14) to be integer.
18It is straightforward to check that for both α00 =0and α00 = S−1 (Tm (A)),e q u a t i o n s(12) are
satisﬁed. Evidently, these equilibria diﬀer in α00.I f S−1 (Tm (A)) = 0,t h e nα10 should equal
0, which violates α10 6=0 .F i n a l l y , S−1 (Tm (A)) = 0 is equivalent to Tm (A)=S (0),w h i c hi s
only possible if m =¯ π (and thus equals M = b¯ πc); similarly, m =¯ π implies ¯ π is integer and
Tm (A)=S (0).
(ii) By Lemma 9, αn0 =0for 1 ≤ n ≤ m. Similarly, α00 =0(because if it is not the case,
the same lemma yields that α00 = α10 =0 ). Since 0 <α 01 < 1, BR01 (α) includes both E and
S, which implies S (0) = T (S (α01)), and therefore, α01 = S−1 ◦ T−1 ◦ S (0). Furthermore, since
S ∈ BRn0 (α) for 1 ≤ n ≤ m, we conclude (recalling that S (α) is a decreasing function) that
α0n ≤ S−1 (A) for n = m,a n dα0n ≤ S−1 ◦ T ◦ S (α0n+) for n<m . It is straightforward to check
that any such proﬁle constitutes an equilibrium. Indeed, there is at least one set of numbers α0n,
1 ≤ n ≤ m satisfying these conditions: α0n = S−1 ◦ T−n ◦ S (0) ( i ti se a s yt oc h e c k ,a sa b o v e ,
that α0m ≤ S−1 (A)). These numbers are determined uniquely either if m =1(so there is no
ambiguity), or if m =¯ π = M (so all inequalities for α0n, 2 ≤ n ≤ m, become equalities). If neither
is the case, then there is a continuum of equilibria with π(α)=m ≥ 1 and α10 =0 .
3.5 Comparative Statics








where R = D
Y .E v i d e n t l y , M is aﬀected by changes in ¯ π only if ¯ π is a non-negative number.
The denominator is always positive, so when we analyze comparative statics, we may consider the
numerator to be non-negative as well.
Now we can analyze comparative statics of ¯ π and M. Empirical support for these results is
provided in Section 4.
Theorem 6 The maximum equilibrium patience M is increasing in D
Y and µ (the probability that
a new contender appears in the next period despite execution of the previous one), and decreases in
p (incumbent’s survivorship rate). In particular, M increases with D (the cost of losing life) and
decreases with Y (incremental utility of being in power).
Proof. Since natural logarithm is an increasing function, the proposition is evident as far as R (and,
therefore, D and Y ) is concerned. Variable p does not appear in the denominator. Diﬀerentiating
the fraction of which the logarithm in the numerator is taken, we obtain
β (1 − β)(1+(1+β)(1− µ))(1 − (1 − µ)(1− β))(1 + R(1 − β))
(1 − β (1 − p)(1− (1 − µ)(1− β)))
2 > 0.
19As for µ, it is necessary to consider both the numerator and the denominator. Diﬀerentiation of
the same expression in the numerator yields
(1 − β)(1− β (1 − 2p))(1 + (1 − β)R)
(1 − β (1 − p)(1− (1 − µ)(1− β)))
2 > 0.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,ln 1
β(1−µ)+µ is obviously decreasing with respect to µ. Since both the numerator
and the denominator are positive, we obtain the necessary comparative statics with respect to µ.
In other words, patience increases with the size of punishment, which is very intuitive, since a
harder punishment makes a person more fearful of it, and increases incentives to spare. A higher p
implies less stability of the dictator’s position and less expected time until losing the ﬁght, which
also decreases incentives to execute. Finally, a higher µ means that one is less likely to experience
a period of safe rule in the case of execution. This also makes execution less proﬁtable.
3.6 Comparing Equilibrium Paths
In this subsection, we characterize equilibrium paths of various equilibria in the game. In most
interesting cases agents play mixed strategies, so the actual game path is random. Still, it is possible
to derive a number of general comparative statics results.
Theorem 7 (i) Consider two equilibria E and E0 given by {αmn} and {α0
mn}.I ff o ra n ym,n we
have αmn ≥ α0
mn
17, then for any m,n the following inequality holds: Umn ≤ U0
mn.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
a less violent equilibrium yields higher utility for all the dictators along the equilibrium path.
(ii) At any equilibrium, if α0m < 1,t h e nUm0 ≥ Um+0 (and if α0m+ < 1,t h e nUm0 >U m+0).
In other words, an additional murder will decrease utility as measured from the period where a new
enemy will emerge (but increases instantaneous next period’s expected utility. If α0m =1 ,t h e n
these utilities are equal.
Proof. (i) If αnm < 1,t h e nα0
nm < 1, and hence Umn = S (αnm), U0
mn = S (α0
nm). The necessary
inequality follows from monotonicity of function S (α).I f αnm =1 , then there are two possible
cases. If n =0 ,t h e nb yL e m m a1 0Umn = A. At the same time, U0
mn is either equal to A or
to S (α0
nm) (if the latter is the case, then α0
nm ≤ S−1 (A)), so in both cases U0
mn ≥ A = Umn.
Finally, if m =0 , n>0,i ti ss u ﬃcient to demonstrate that W0




mn = Umn.B o t h W10 and W0
10 may be found from (9). Its right-hand side
17This is the case, for example, if α00 ≥ α
0










Figure 2: Equilibrium Path If α00 =0
increasing with respect to Umn (that’s trivial), and decreasing with respect to αnm (diﬀerentiation
yields
−
p(D(1 − β)+pβ (Umn + D))
(1 − (1 − αnm)β (1 − p))
2 < 0,
since Umn ≥− D). However, α0
01 ≤ αnm, and we have already proved that U0
10 ≥ U10.T h e r e f o r e ,
W0
10 ≥ W10, and hence U0
mn ≥ Umn in the remaining case, too.
(ii) If α0m < 1,t h e nUm0 = S (α0m). At the same time, if α0m+ < 1,t h e nα0m+ >α 0m
(Lemma 7), and hence Um+0 = S (α0m+) <S(α0m)=Um0.I f ,h o w e v e r ,α0m+ =1 ,t h e nUE
m0 = A
(Lemma 11) and Um+0 = A (Lemma 10), and we get Um0 ≥ UE
m0 = Um+0. Finally, if α0m =1 ,
then α0m+ =1(monotonicity), and hence both Um0 and Um+0 are equal to A.
Despite the multiplicity of equilibria, equilibrium paths of the game may be naturally split into
two major groups. Evidently, all equilibria where α00 =0lead to a trivial equilibrium path, which
is depicted on Figure 2. The winner always spares, and even if he loses, the game returns back to
the state (0,0).
In other words, the state (0,0) remains forever.18 The average duration of each rule is given by
Theorem 8.
Theorem 8 If α00 =0 , then on the equilibrium path players 1 and 2 always spare each other, and
replace each other on the dictator’s position. The mean duration of each subsequent rule equals 1
p.
18One can also consider the situation where α00 =0 , but the game (for any reason, say, a deviation of any player)
c o m e st ot h es t a t eo t h e rt h a n(0,0).I nt h a tc a s e ,i fα10 6=0 , then the game evolves as if the corresponding equilibrium
with α00 = S
−1 (T
m (A)) was played (m is the patience of the equilibrium), and the latter will be considered later
in this subsection. If, however, α10 =0 , then the following happens. If the state of the game is (n,0), then the
incumbent executes until he eventually loses to the contender, which brings the game to the state (0,k), k ≥ n.I n
such states, the contender eliminates the violent dictator, bringing the game to the state (0,1). If the game is at
the state (n,0) or (0,n),w h e r e1 ≤ n ≤ m, then it evolves as follows. The dictator who killed at least once before
never kills again. However, he is killed by the contender who never killed before with probability α0n > 0.I f t h i s
happens, the game again moves to the state (0,1), and the contender who just killed never kills again, but is subject











































Figure 3: Equilibrium Path If α00 6=0(m =3 )
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the statement is evident, since the game is stuck in the state (0,0).T h e


























Conversely, if α00 6=0 ,t h e r em a yb eav a r i e t yo fp a t h s ,p a r a m e t r i z e db yp a t i e n c eo fe q u i l i b r i u m
m ≤ M. The switching of states for the case m =3is depicted on Figure 3. In the picture, the
probabilities of execution at each node is shown; the probability of sparing is of course one minus
this value. The decision-maker loses with probability p in the next battle, so the game come to
diﬀerent states, and this is shown with dashed and dotted lines.
In an equilibrium with non-trivial equilibrium path, the probability of a bloody dictator to be
punished increases with the number of murders committed, until it reaches 1. The next Theorem
states that this growth is accelerating.
Theorem 9 Suppose that 0 ≤ k<n≤ m,w h e r em is patience of an equilibrium with a non-trivial
path. Then in that equilibrium α0k+ − α0k <α 0n+ − α0n.
22Proof. First, let’s prove that αm+0 =1>S −1 ¡
T−1 (A)
¢
.S i n c eS is decreasing, and T is increasing,
it is suﬃcient to prove that A>T(S (1)). It may be checked straightforwardly that
A − T (S (1)) =
pβ2 (1 − p)(1− µ)(β (1 − µ)+µ)(Y + D(1 − β))
(1 − β (β (1 − µ)+µ)(1− p))(1 − β (1 − p))
> 0.
















for 0 ≤ k<n≤ m. For any integer z, S−1 (Tz (A)) = S−1
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The latter expression is well-deﬁned for real z. For any real x,d e n o t ef (x) ≡ S−1 (x) and g (x) ≡
Y






.I fw ep r o v et h a tf (g (z)) is a convex function of z,w ew i l lp r o v e
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Function S (α) is decreasing (Lemma 2) and convex (to see this, notice that its ﬁrst derivative is
increasing, for the denominator in (7) is increasing in α). Therefore, its inverse f (x) is decreasing
a n dc o n v e xa sw e l l .F u n c t i o n(β (1 − µ)+µ)
x is decreasing (because β (1 − µ)+µ<1) and convex,
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¢0 = f00 (g(z))
¡
g0 (z)
¢2 + f0 (g (z))g00 (z) > 0,
because each factor in the ﬁrst item is positive, and both factors in the second one are negative.
The intuition behind Theorem 9 is straightforward. Why, indeed, a greater increase in proba-
bility of revenge is needed to prevent the ﬁfth murder (i.e. to make the decision-maker indiﬀerent
between killing and sparing) as compared to what is needed to prevent the second murder? The
reason is that an incremental increase in probability of being murdered values more for a person
who committed one murder than to one who committed four murders Since a serial killer (the one
who killed four in this example) is more likely to be executed sooner than a one-time killer, the
“Damocle’s Sword" would hang upon him for a longer time.
It is also informative to depict probabilities of committing a murder and being murdered as
considered by a person who committed n murders in the past, when facing an innocent opponent.
We choose a certain set of parameters (Y =1 0 , D =6 , p =0 .5, β =0 .9, µ =0 .2); in that case,
maximum patience M =6 . On Figure 4, we show probabilities αn0 and α0n as functions of n (the
number of murders committed in the past) for m =2and m =5 .
As one can see from Figure 4, in equilibria with non-trivial equilibrium paths, the probability
that a bloody dictator will execute his adversary is a function that has two values, one of which
is 1. In the beginning, bloody dictators execute and spare with constant probabilities (depending
on parameters of the model and the patience of equilibrium, of course), being aware that every





























Figure 4: Probabilities of Executions for Diﬀerent Patience Parameters
additional murder increases their chance to be executed (since probabilities of being murdered by
innocent contenders) are monotonically increasing. When this fear is no longer in eﬀect, both
probabilities of murdering and of being murdered simultaneously reach 1 and stabilize there. Also,
It is easy to see from Figure 4 that bloody dictator’s probabilities of being executed are convex
functions (until they reach 1), which illustrates Theorem 9.
As a model of institutional development, the killing game might be endowed with a much more
elaborate story. In a companion paper (Egorov and Sonin, 2005), we analyze a game, where the
probability of the incumbent’s survival, p, is determined endogenously. Speciﬁcally, the incumbent
dictator hires an agent of a certain competence, trading oﬀ beneﬁts of having a smart vizier and
costs of the possible betrayal. (A more competent agent is more able to distinguish the enemy’s
type, and, therefore, is less loyal in equilibrium.) In particular, the more killings happen along the
equilibrium paths, the lower is the quality of incumbent’s viziers. Also, the model allows for an
exogenous probability of the incumbent’s death, which provides an opportunity to break a bloody
equilibrium path.
244 Historical Narrative
As the analytic narrative approach (Bates et al., 1998, 2000, Levi, 2003) suggests, theoretical
models, a primary tool of economics and political science, allow us to read, organize and present
empirical evidence in a narrative form, which is a primary tool of historical science. There are two
basic reasons for this form of organizing discussion: First, econometric inference of empirical content
of multiple equilibria models, even if data is well-identiﬁed, is an arduous task. Jovanovic (1989) and
Bisin, Moro, and Topa (2002) assert that proper inference could be made under very restrictive
assumptions; the dynamic nature of our equilibria makes it even harder. Second, problems of
identiﬁcation and interpretation of historical data related to leadership survival make analytic
narrative a more appropriate tool of analysis.
What does our theory say about cross-country comparison of dictatorships?19 To illustrate the
existence of two paths with markedly diﬀerent characteristics, which correspond to the only pure-
strategy equilibria in our model, we ﬁrst discuss general patterns in Europe and Latin America, and
then focus on two particular examples, Venezuela, 1830—1970 and the Ottoman Empire, 1230—1922.
One diﬀerence between the two examples is of course that the Ottoman Empire was a hereditary
monarchy and Latin American countries were not.20 However, an Ottoman Empire was not a place
where succession was automatic; any male descendant of Osman, with no regard to seniority, could
have become a sultan (Finer, 1997, p. 1171). Often, there were brothers succeeding the deposed
dictator; the fact that most of sultans had many children made competition for succession serious.
The diﬀerence which can be predicted by our comparative statics is that in a monarchy, the set of
potential contenders is limited and pre-deﬁned (e.g., all brothers, sons, and nephews); accordingly,
it might really make sense to try to eliminate all potential contenders.
European monarchies of the era witnessed signiﬁcantly fewer executions and killings of kings,
though it was not impossible. (And, of course, the fate of numerous contenders was very often mis-
erable.) E.g., Richard III of England was immortalized by Thomas More and William Shakespeare
19Footnote 1 provides a list of rulers killed after being ousted from power in countries that witnessed at least two
such incidents during the last ﬁfty years. Other rulers killed during this period include Melchior Ndadaye in Burundi
(1993), Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala (1957), Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso (1987), Salvatore Allende in
Chile (1973), Long Boreth in Cambodia (1975), Sylvanus Olimpio in Togo (1963), François Tombalbaye in Chad
(1975). Violent deaths of leaders not associated with a serious attempt to change the regime, e.g. of Anwar as-Sadat
in Egypt (1981), Indira Gandhi in India (1984), René Moawad in Lebanon (1989), Yitzhak Rabin in Israel (1995),
or Loran Kabila in Congo (2001) are not such examples. Both samples are truncated since they do not take into
account unsuccessful contenders that were killed during a coup or executed thereafter.
20Another diﬀerence might be that the Venezuelan period we focus on spans only 19th and 20th centuries, which
might be more civilized than e.g. 13th and 14th century. In the Ottoman Empire, most of bloody executions of royal
family members indeed happened earlier than 19th century.
25for slaying the baby-king Edward V and his brother Richard in an attempt to secure the crown
for himself.21 The young princes, sons of the previous king Edward IV of England, were declared
illegitimate by the Act of Parliament known as Titulus Regius; however, the act of parliament was
legally reversible, which make them a potential threat for Richard III.22 Execution of Mary Stuart
of Scots by Elizabeth I of England was apparently aimed at reducing the probability of a pro-Stuart
coup. In 1685, James Crofts, Duke of Monmouth, a bastard child of Charles II of England, was
executed within nine days after capture (cf. typically long trials of other British royals in 17th
century). The apparent reason for that was he proclaimed himself James II, the king of England,
thus endangering the power of the existing king, also James II, his uncle.23 Even executions of
kings committed by revolutionaries (e.g. Charles I of England, Louis XVI of France, and Nikolai II
of Russia, whose mere existence — even after abdication — made them contenders to power), were
in part motivated by consideration highlighted by our theory.24
In a fundamental study of patterns of political succession in England, Bartlet (2002) notes that
“between the 11th and early 14th, defeated political opponents of high birth were ... scarcely ever
maimed or killed in cold blood.” However, in the Celtic part of British Isles, “the kings and princes
of Wales, Ireland, and Gaelic Scotland continued to employ blinding, maiming, and killing in their
conﬂicts with rivals from both with-in and with-out their families” (Bartlet, 2002). Bartlet and
earlier medieval studies such as Pollock and Maitland (1898) contrast the virtual absence of royal-
member executions in Norman and Angevin England with the bloodiness of the later Middle Ages
and Tudor period. Figure 5 at the end of the paper illustrates that by 1486, the last year of the
thirty years of the War of Roses, the only surviving male from both houses of York and Lancaster
was the ruling king, Henry VII. Both chronological (in 1455—1486 in contrast to the previous period)
and geographical (Celtic part vs. Wales, Ireland, and Gaelic Scotland, in 1075—1225) concentration
of killings support the idea of history-dependence highlighted by our theoretical model.
To further illustrate how diﬀerent degree of security aﬀected the winner’s attitude to the mere
presence of potential contenders, compare accessions of two young and vivacious women, Elizabeth I
21Historians do not universally take More’s account as authentic. Still, there is no doubt that the ‘Princes of the
Tower’ were killed, and the primarily motive was elimination of potential heirs to the throne, either for the beneﬁt
of Richard III, Henry VII, or even of Duke of Buckingham, also a descendant of Edward III.
22Bartlet (2002) provides an example of situation where, against all odds, King Stephen did not kill 6-years old
William Marshal (a future regent of England), given to him as a hostage by his father John.
23As in the case of Princes of the Tower, being a bastard (a legal term at that time) does not automatically exclude
the person from the set of legitimate contenders.
24A famous example of the ‘elimination strategy’ is the Slaughter of Innocent. Upon hearing the prophecy that
he would be dethroned by the just-born ‘King of the Jews’, King Herod ordered to kill all male children under two
years of age in Bethlehem.
26of Russia in 1741 and Catherine II (the Great) in 1762.25 Each of them was brought to power by a
military coup organized by young oﬃcers of elite guard divisions. Elizabeth I removed the one-year
old tsar, Ivan VI, and his parents, who were the regents designated by the predecessor, Empress
Anna, Elizabeth’s cousin. Upon Elizabeth’s accession, Ivan VI was not killed but isolated and
guarded in diﬀerent fortresses, and his parents were exiled. Catherine II removed from power her
husband, Emperor Peter III, who was designated as a successor by Elizabeth. Though Peter III was
not executed immediately after the removal from power, he was assassinated within two weeks by
people Catherine sent to ‘watch him’. Archives contain a hand-written note by one of the assassins,
where he proudly reports the death of Catherine’s husband. Furthermore, Ivan VI, who had been
spared by Elizabeth and kept in prison for 22 years, was killed soon on a Catherine’s order by his
guards, fearful of a plot to rescue him.
The crucial diﬀerence in attitude of Elizabeth and Catherine to those whom they removed from
power and who could have been expected to become if not the center, but at least a focal element
of opposition, might be in that Elizabeth was a daughter of Peter the Great, the Russian tsar in
1696—1725, and thus was a heir at least as legitimate as those whom she replaced.26 In contrast,
Catherine was a daughter of an obscure count in Prussia (Germany), and was ‘imported’ to marry
Peter III, who was a great-grandchild of Peter the Great and a nephew of the reigning Empress
Elizabeth. Thus, Catherine, the ‘illegitimate’ ruler, had to take much more care of contenders’
fates than Elizabeth.
4.1 Dynastic Succession
The House of Osman ruled the Ottoman Empire from 1281 to 1922; oﬃcially, the sultan was the
sole source of governmental authority in the empire. During more than six centuries covered in the
list of the Ottoman sultans, there was almost no hostile comebacks. The main reason for this was
that, after a coup, the loser, be it the incumbent or the contender, was usually executed.27 Still, by
25Women occupied the Russian throne for more than a half of the 18th century, and half of them were brought to
power by a military coup.
26Although Elizabeth was unable to accede to power without a military coup (which happen in 1742), she was
named a heir to the throne by her mother (who died in 1727, when Elizabeth was 18), who in turn inherited the
throne from Peter the Great, her husband, in 1725 (Massie, 1980).
27The ﬁrst ‘comeback’ in the Ottoman Empire was not a result of a hostile ﬁght between the predecessor, Murad II,
and his son, Mehmed II. Indeed, During his ﬁrst reign, seeing the upcoming Battle of Varna, Mehmed sent for his
father, Murad II, asking him to claim the throne again to ﬁght the enemy, only to be refused. Enraged at his father,
who was then retired to rest in southwestern Anatolia, Mehmed in his famous letter wrote to his father: “If you are
the sultan, come and lead your armies. If I am the sultan I hereby order you to come and lead my armies.” It was
upon this letter that Murad II led the Ottoman army in the Battle of Varna in 1444. (Alderson, 1982, p. 62 details
27many standards, the Ottoman Empire resembled European monarchies. Alderson (1982) notes that
average duration of an Osmanli sultan’s reign (17 years), compares favorably with Roman emperors
(7 years), Byzantine emperors (12), Abbasid caliphs (12) and is close to European monarchies such
as Russia (18), France (21) and Britain (23).28 Still, Alderson (1982) counted 17 depositions
from Bayezid I to Abdul-Hamid II, almost a half of all sultans. Executions of predecessors, failed
contenders, or just potential contenders such as younger brothers, was indeed wide-spread. At least
11 sultans were killed during or soon after a hostile disposition from power. Of sultans that were
not killed upon the accession of a new sultan, four were the last sultans of the Empire in the period
of 1876—1922; one of them, Murad V, ruled for only 93 days in 1876 and was widely believed to
suﬀer mental illness. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that killing the predecessor was a typical
strategy in the Ottoman Empire.
Another course of actions, typical for the Ottoman Empire and all but unseen in Venezuela, was
killing of potential heirs to the throne. Beyazid I (1389—1402), Mehmed I (1413—1421), Mehmed II
(1444—1445, 1451—1481), Murad II (1421—1444, 1445—1451), Selim I (1512—1520), Suleiman I, (1520—
1566), Mustafa IV (1807—1808), Mahmud II (1808—1839) put some of their brothers or sons (and
often other relatives) to death. Of course Mehmed III (1595—1603) stays notorious even in this
long list for having his sixteen brothers killed upon his accession. His son, Ahmed I broke with
the pattern, refusing to execute his mentally retarded brother Mustafa I (1617—1618, 1622—1623).
Mehmed II enacted the ‘Law of Fratricide’, which said literally that a sultan may lawfully put his
brother to death. Alderson (1982) counted 80 such executions in 650-year span.
The tradition to kill potential contenders persisted even in 19th century. In 1808, a janissary
revolt brought to power Mustafa, a son of Abd-ul-Hamid I. Mustafa ordered execution of his brother
Selim, the disposed sultan, as well as his another brother, Mahmud. Selim was killed, but Mahmud,
the only remaining male member in line for succession, escaped, revolted against Mustafa, and had
him executed upon succession to the throne.
It is plausible again to juxtapose the Ottoman Empire experience with that of the Russian
Empire. As in the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire has had a well-deﬁned sequence of absolute
rulers for a prolonged period, since early 14th century, and the diﬀerence in average durations is
minimal (17 and 18, respectively). In Russia, we witness both (i) less deaths of predecessors and
(ii) more examples of people being removed from power, but spared. There might be only single
execution of a heir by the current ruler (prince Alexis, who was accused of conspiring in the plot
more hostility in both accession and temporary deposition of Mehmed.) The second ‘comeback’ (1622) also appears
to be very speciﬁc, as Mustafa I, reportedly mentally retarded (Finer, 1997, p. 1172), was merely a ‘façade’ king.
28We use the following sources on the Ottoman Empire: Alderson (1982), Finer (1997), McCarthy (1997), and
Palmer (1992).
28against his father Peter the Great; the ultimate circumstances of Alexis’s death are unknown, e.g.,
Massie, 1980)29 and a single episode of a son successfully, though passively, participating in a plot
against his father (Alexander I against his father Pavel I in 1801). There were examples that people
were removed from power or succession line and not executed (Vasily Shuisky, Sophia, a half-sister
of Peter the Great, Peter the Great himself, Ivan VI, Konstantin).30
The Russian history provides another example of the sparing equilibrium, a power struggle of
two boyar clans each of which has a boy contender to the throne (chronology: Massie, 1980). In
1669, Maria Miloslavskaya, the ﬁrst wife of tsar Alexis died, survived by 4 children, including her
ailing sons Fedor and Ivan. Two years later, in 1671, Alexis married Natalya Naryshkina, and
the whole clan of Miloslavskys, including Maria Miloslavskaya’s father, but not Fedor and Ivan,
went into exile. In 1672, son Peter is born. In 1676, Alexis died, Fedor was proclaimed tsar, and
Miloslavskys (including grandparents of Fedor) were returned, while Naryshkins were exiled (but
not killed).
In 1682, tsar Fedor died, and his half-brother Peter, aged ten, was proclaimed tsar. Fedor’s
brother Ivan, 16, who was burdened with several chronic illnesses, conceded to Peter’s accession
and was kept in the Kremlin palace unharmed, while the Naryshkins (including the former ﬁrst
minister Artamon Matveev, tsarina Nataliya’s guardian) were returned from exile. In a few days,
most important Naryshkins, including Artamon Matveev, were killed in a military uprising, Sophia
Miloslavskaya became regent, formally on behalf of her brother Ivan and half-brother Peter. Though
Peter, a single royal male in the Naryshkins clan, was in hands of Miloslavskys, his life was not
threatened. In 1689, Peter acceded to power in bloodless coup; Sophia was kept under home arrest
for rest of her life (until 1704). The essence of the story is that, despite very strong incentives and
excellent opportunities on each side to kill the heir representing the rival clan, they deliberately
abstained from that.
4.2 Nonhereditary Succession
The history of Venezuela since early 19th century — we start with the year of 1830, the ﬁrst year
of full state independence — serves us as a vivid example that dozens of dictators that come and
29Ivan the Terrible’s son Ivan was killed by his father in a quarrel; however, there is a lot of evidence that it was
accidental.
30In contrast with the Ottoman Empire, killing of non-rivaling siblings was near-taboo in Russia since the very
early years: in 1217, Prince Gleb Vladimirovich of Ryazan was thrown out by citizens of his state after ordering to
kill his brothers, princes of neighbouring states, at a dinner table. The ﬁrst Russian saints of the Orthodox Church
were young and innocent princes Boris and Gleb, killed by their brother Svyatopolk. Of course, Russian princes have
had less legitimate consanguineous brothers than Ottoman rulers.
29go need not be necessarily harsh on their predecessors.31 One reason for relative exsanguinity
at the very top was, as we argue, the equilibrium behavior of winners. Correctly anticipating a
high probability to be removed from power, they opted for a mild treatment of their predecessors.
Another reason was the absence of a royal family and/or aristocratic tradition, which made it
impossible to signiﬁcantly reduce the set of contenders (µ is high, in terms of the model). It could
be argued that Venezuela in 1830—1964 provides a typical example of a Latin American country
and polity; we identiﬁed comeback military rulers in almost every Latin American country.
For example, of 54 presidents and provisional rulers of Mexico in the 19th century, 17 have
held this positions more than one time, and 7 came back to power at least two times (Cahoon,
2004). General de Santa Anna, “the Napoleon of Mexico”, came back at least 5 times (and 11 by
some accounts).32 In Chile, General Ramon Freire came back 5 times. In Cuba, the last comeback
dictator was Fulgencio Batista, who came to power twice (in 1933 and 1952) by means of a military
coup (Domínguez, 1998). In Venezuela, among 56 changes in leadership (this ﬁgure includes all
constitutional leaders — elected, military, and provisional), there were 14 comebacks by 10 leaders
who had previously been constitutional leaders of the country. Needless to say, a comeback is the
most visible sign that the person had not been executed after removal from power the previous
time. On the other hand, some of the rulers indeed died in oﬃce or shortly after removal from
power.
Among the generals that ruled Venezuela during 20 years after 1830, there are Jose Paez (1830—
1835 and 1839—1843, president, 1861—1863, supreme dictator), Carlos Soublette (1837—1839, pro-
visional president, 1843—1847, president, 1858, provisional president), Jose Tadeo Monagas (1847—
1851, 1851—1855, 1868) and Pedro Gual (1859, provisional president, 1861, president). In 1837,
1848, 1858, 1859, 1861 (twice), 1863, and 1868, transition of power was hostile. Still, even in the
exceptionally bloody 1858 turmoil that started the Federal War, the outgoing dictator Monagas,
who had forced Paez in exile, was allowed to ﬁnd a refuge ﬁrst in the French embassy, and then
to retire to France (only to come back in ten years).33 Julian Castro, the president that removed
Monagas in 1858 and was removed by Gual in 1859, was convicted for treason, but absolved. Páez
staged unsuccessful coups in 1848 and 1849 against Monagas and was exiled (1850—58). In 1861,
Páez returned to become the supreme dictator.
31Our brief overview of Venezuelan leadership in historical perspective is based primarily on Munro (1950), Levine
(1978), and Rudolph and Rudolph (1996). For modern military coups in Latin America, see Linz and Stephen, 1978;
empirical patterns are analyzed in Luttwak (1979), Ferguson (1978), O’Kane (1978), and Farcau (1994).
32This would not be surprising if General de Santa Anna were a democratic politician, coming back and forth via
elections. However, most of power changes were military coups.
33It would be only fair to note that his younger brother, Jose Gregorio Monagas, who was president in 1851—1855,
was put to jail after the coup of 1858 and died the same year.
30The end of the Federal War brought General Antonio Guzman Blanco in to the center of
Venezuelan political arena. He ﬁrst became president in 1870 (before that he was acting president
temporarily replacing General Falcon, his military principal during the Federal War, and the pres-
ident in 1864—1868), ousting José Ruperto Monagas, a son of José Tadeo Monagas (the Monagas
who was President in 1847—1851 and 1855—1858), who brought to power by the coup of 1868. In
1877, Guzman left the oﬃce and went to France. In 1880, after the death of President Linares (in
1878) and ouster of his short-lived successor Jose Gregorio Varela, Guzman returned to Venezuela
a n dt o o kp o w e rb yac o u pa g a i n . 34 Another comeback, Joaquin Crespo, was president ﬁrst in
1884—86 (replacing Guzman Blanco who left for Paris only to be back in 1886) and from 1892 to
1898, when he was killed during a revolt against his desired successor. Joaquin Crespo appears to
be the only ruler of Venezuela in two centuries to be killed during or shortly after a coup; there
has been no evidence that he was executed rather than killed in a ﬁght.
The ﬁrst half of the 20th century was the era of Juan Vincente Gomez, who took power in 1908
and was formally a president or a provisional president in 1908—1914, 1915—1929 and 1931—1935.
However, this might not be an illustrative example of a comeback president, since historians agree
that, whatever has been his oﬃcial position, he was the undisputed ruler of Venezuela since 1908
until his death in 1935.
The second half of the 20th century has changed the patterns of dictatorship, though the
phenomenon of ‘comeback rulers’ persisted even with democracy gaining a more solid ground since
the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt, who himself was a comeback military leader. After taking
power in 1945, he was ousted by a military coup in 1948, was returned by another coup in 1958 and
voluntarily left presidency in 1964. Since 1964, two Venezuelan politicians were presidents twice
(they were barred from running for a second consecutive term by constitution), but each time they
were elected in a democratic election.35
5C o n c l u s i o n
Most advanced analysis of political and economic history draws insights from studies of large-scale
institutional change. The challenge we took upon in this paper is to reconcile historical processes
with micro decisions made by signiﬁcant decision-makers at critical points in history. In this paper,
34While some sources, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), consider the period of 1870—1892 as that of an
interrupted rule of Guzman Blanco, with those formally holding the presidency being his puppets, others read this
as a story of hostile come-backs (e.g., Rudolph and Rudolph, 1996). It is doubtful that even a full-scale historical
investigation of the matter would result in an unambiguous interpretation.
35Still, Carlos Andres Pérez, who was president in 1974—1978, and was elected again in 1989, survived two military
coups during his second term, and was ﬁnally suspended from the oﬃce under charges of corruption.
31we study reputation and knowledge in a complete information game with an inﬁnite number of
players. The rational winner in a power struggle determines the fate of the loser. His choice
of equilibrium strategy decisions is motivated by two basic considerations: ﬁrst, he is willing to
increase the probability of survival by reducing the set of potential contenders. Second, he fears
that a bad reputation would serve him poorly should he in turn become the loser. One conclusion
t h a tw ea r ea b l et oi l l u s t r a t ee m p l o y i n gah i s t o rical narrative is the existence of markedly diﬀerent
equilibria paths. Between 1830 and nowadays, Venezuela witnessed a larger number of successful
hostile comebacks of leaders that were disposed earlier. In a drastic contrast, in the Ottoman
Empire, a hereditary monarchy, a typical move by a new ruler was to try to kill all the potential
contenders to the throne.
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n0 leads to a contradiction. By the single-crossing condition, UE
n+0 >U S
n+0.
This implies αn+0 =1 , and hence α0n+ =1 .
P r o o fo fL e m m a7 . Since α0n+ < 1, α0n < 1 as well. Therefore, Un0 = S (α0n) and Un+0 =
S (α0n+). Consider, however, UE
n0.W eh a v e
UE
n0 = Y + β ((1 − µ)(Y + βWn+0)+µWn+0)
=( 1 − µ)Y +( ( 1− µ)β + µ)(Y + βWn+0)
=( 1 − µ)Y +( ( 1− µ)β + µ)US
n+0.
Assume that S (α0n) ≤ S (α0n+)+ε,w eo b t a i n
UE
n0 − Un0 =( 1 − µ)Y +( ( 1− µ)β + µ)S (α0n+) − S (α0n)
≥ (1 − µ)Y +( ( 1− µ)β + µ)S (α0n+) − S (α0n+) − ε
≥ (1 − µ)(Y − S (α0n+)(1− β)) − ε
≥ (1 − µ)(Y − S (0)(1 − β)) − ε
≥
(1 − µ)βpY
(1 − β +2 pβ)
− ε.
Therefore, if we take ε<
(1−µ)βpY
(1−β+2pβ), assertion that S (α0n) ≤ S (α0n+)+ε would lead to a contra-
diction. Then S (α0n) >S(α0n+)+ε, and, since S is strictly decreasing, α0n <α 0n+.
Proof of Lemma 8. By previous lemmas, it is suﬃcient to demonstrate that α0n =1for some
n. If it were not true, however, then we would ﬁnd that S (α00) − S (α0n) may be an arbitrarily
large number. This contradicts the fact that both numbers lie between S (1) and S (0).
P r o o fo fL e m m a9 . An agent in the states (0,m) and (0,m +) is indiﬀerent whether to execute




0m+. The utility from execution in either of these states are
equal to
UE




0m+ = S (αm+0).S i n c e S (α) is a strictly decreasing function,
αm0 = αm+0.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 0 . Since α0m =1 , the agent at least does not strictly prefer to spare, and
thus Um0 = UE
m0.S i n c eα0m+ =1 ,
Wm+0 =
1 − p − β (1 − α0m+)(1− 2p)
1 − (1 − α0m+)β (1 − p)
Um+0 −
α0m+pD
1 − (1 − α0m+)β (1 − p)
=( 1 − p)Um+0 − pD,
36and hence
Um0 = UE
m0 =( 1+β (1 − µ))Y + β (β (1 − µ)+µ)Wm+0 (16)
=( 1 + β (1 − µ))Y + β (β (1 − µ)+µ)((1 − p)Um+0 − pD).
Let us demonstrate that Um0 = Um+0. If we substitute Um+0 in (16) for
(1 + β (1 − µ))Y + β (β (1 − µ)+µ)
¡
(1 − p)U(m+2)0 − pD
¢
etc., then after n iterations (denote
γ = β (β (1 − µ)+µ)(1− p))w ew i l lg e t










|Um0 − Um+0| = γn ¯ ¯U(m+n)0 − U(m+n+1)0







Since 0 <γ<1,a n dn can be chosen arbitrarily large, we conclude that Um0 − Um+0 =0 .
Substituting in (16) Um+0 for Um0,w ew i l lﬁnd Um0 = A.
To prove that A>S(1), simply subtract these values.
A − S (1)
=
(1 + β (1 − µ))Y − β (β (1 − µ)+µ)pD
1 − β (β (1 − µ)+µ)(1− p)
−
Y − βpD
1 − β (1 − p)
=
βp(1 − µ)(Y + D(1 − β))(1 − µ)pβ
(1 − β (β (1 − µ)+µ)(1− p))(1 − β (1 − p))
> 0.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 1 . Evidently,
UE
m0 =( 1 + β (1 − µ))Y + β (β (1 − µ)+µ)Wm+0
=( 1 + β (1 − µ))Y + β (β (1 − µ)+µ)((1 − p)A − pD)=A.
The last equality follows from deﬁnition of A.
37killed in battle                   ,    executed
Figure 5: “Killing Equilibrium” in the War of Roses (1455-1486)
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